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Group-size effects on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game
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We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the effects that
are brought about by different sizes of groups where individuals collect their payoffs and search for potential
strategy donors. We find that increasing the group size does not necessarily lead to mean-field behavior, as is
traditionally observed for games governed by pairwise interactions, but rather that public cooperation may be
additionally promoted by means of enhanced spatial reciprocity that sets in for very large groups. Our results
highlight that the promotion of cooperation due to spatial interactions is not rooted solely in having restricted
connections amongst players, but also in individuals having the opportunity to collect payoffs separately from
their direct opponents. Moreover, in large groups the presence of a small number of defectors is bearable, which
makes the mixed phase region expand with increasing group size. Having a chance of exploiting distant players,
however, offers defectors a new way to break the phalanx of cooperators, and even to resurrect from small
numbers to eventually completely invade the population.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 89.75.Fb
The public goods game [1, 2] is played in groups and cap-
tures the essential social dilemma in that collective and indi-
vidual interests are inherently different. Players must decide
simultaneously whether they wish to contribute to the com-
mon pool, i.e. to cooperate, or not. All the contributions are
then multiplied to take into account synergetic effects of coop-
eration, and the resulting amount is divided equally among all
group members irrespective of their strategies. Selfish play-
ers obviously should decline to contribute if the investment
costs exceed the return of the game. However, if nobody de-
cides to invest the group fails to harvest the benefits of a col-
lective investment, and the society may evolve towards the
“tragedy of the commons” [3]. Yet despite of the obvious so-
cial dilemma, observations indicate that individuals cooperate
much more in public goods games than expected [4], which
calls for the identification of mechanisms that can sustain co-
operation. The sustenance of cooperation in sizable groups
of unrelated individuals, as is the case by the public goods
game, is particularly challenging since group interactions tend
to blur the trails of those who defect. Unlike by pairwise inter-
actions, reciprocity [5, 6] often fails as it is not straightforward
to determine with whom to reciprocate. Social enforcement,
on the other hand, may work well, although it is challenged
by the fact that it is costly (see [7] for a review). Recently
studied ways of promoting cooperation in public goods games
include the introduction of volunteering [8, 9] and the intro-
duction of social diversity by means of complex interaction
networks [10, 11], random exploration of strategies [12], as
well as various forms of reward [13–16] and punishment [17–
20], to name but a few.
Spatial reciprocity [21], being part of the big five [22], is
long established as a prominent mechanism for the evolution
of cooperation [23]. The spatial public goods game [24] in
particular, is interesting also from the viewpoint of physics,
for example in terms of phase transitions [25], pattern for-
mation [26], effects of inhomogeneous player activities [27],
diversity [28] and noise [29], as well as coevolutionary pro-
cesses [30] and processes taking place on complex networks
[31, 32]. While the efficiency of spatial reciprocity is known
FIG. 1: Left: Schematic presentation of different group sizes G on
the square lattice. Depicted are groups containing G = 9 (open
square), 45 (grey square), 97 (plus), 185 (filled square) and 301
(cross) players, respectively. The focal player is marked by a star.
Right: Schematic presentation of possible sources of strategy inva-
sion. Three different cases are considered, namely, the adoption can
only be attempted from the nearest neighbors (open squares), from
the focal group (white patch), or from all the groups (grey areas)
where the focal player is a member.
to be vitally affected by the structure of interaction graphs
[33], there is still a lack of studies systematically analyz-
ing the impact of group size on the evolution of cooperation.
Although it is traditionally assumed that very large groups
should result in mean-field behavior due to the emergence of
all-to-all coupling (see e.g. [34]), certain studies suggest that
this may not always be the case [35]. Adding to this the ex-
perimental findings [36], indicating that larger groups (of size
40 or 100) provide public goods more efficiently than small
groups (of size 4 or 10), clearly outlines the need for clarify-
ing the importance of the group size, especially for games that
are governed by group interactions.
Here we therefore study the evolution of cooperation in
the public goods game on the square lattice, whereon ini-
tially each player on site x is designated either as a cooper-
ator (sx = C) or defector (sx = D) with equal probabil-
ity. We note, however, that the main findings do not depend
on the host lattice topology because the large group size in-
teractions diminish the fine topological differences. Players
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FIG. 2: Critical multiplication factor rc in dependence on G. Strat-
egy donors were selected only from the four nearest neighbors (filled
squares), from within the group of players where player x is fo-
cal (open circles), or amongst all the groups where player x is a
member (filled circles). The uncertainty by strategy adoptions was
K/G = 0.1 (the normalization of K with G takes into account the
number of groups participating in the accumulation of payoffs).
can collect payoffs from groups ranging in size from G = 5
to 445, as depicted schematically in Fig. 1. In addition, we
also consider different groups of players that are eligible to
act as strategy donors, ranging from nearest neighbors only
to all players that are members in the groups containing the
focal player, i.e. the one potentially adopting a new strategy.
Note that there exist exactly n = G groups containing any
given player x (one group where player x is focal and n − 1
groups where this is not the case). Each selected player x ac-
quires its payoff Px by accumulating its share of the public
good from all the n groups with which it is affiliated (un-
less stated otherwise). Without loss of generality coopera-
tors contribute 1 to the pool while defectors contribute noth-
ing, and subsequently all the contributions within a group are
multiplied by the enhancement factor r and divided equally
amongst all the members. Employing the Monte Carlo simu-
lation procedure, each elementary step involves randomly se-
lecting one focal player x and one player y that is eligible to
act as a strategy donor. Following the accumulation of pay-
offs Px and Py as described above, player y tries to enforce
its strategy sy on player x in accordance with the probabil-
ity W (sy → sx) = {1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]}−1, where K
determines the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [29]. To ac-
count for the different number of groups affecting the absolute
values of the payoffs when increasing G (and thus indirectly
influencingW ), parameters r andK must be considered prop-
erly normalized with G to ensure relevant comparisons of re-
sults. During a Monte Carlo step (MCS) all players will have
a chance to pass their strategy once on average. For the results
presented below we used the square lattice having L = 400
to 1600 linear size and up to 107 MCS before determining the
stationary fraction of cooperators ρC within the whole popu-
lation.
Figure 2 features the critical multiplication factor rc at
which cooperators die out in dependence on G. Above this
 0.0
 
 0.2
 
 0.4
 
 0.6
 
 0.8
 
 1.0
 0   100   200   300   400  
r c
 
/  
G
G
FIG. 3: Critical multiplication factor rc in dependence on G, as ob-
tained when the payoffs are acquired from a single group where the
corresponding players are focal. The symbols correspond to those
used in Fig. 2, determining the set of potential strategy donors. The
uncertainty by strategy adoptions was K = 0.1 (note that the nor-
malization withG is unnecessary since all the payoffs originate from
a single group).
rc value the cooperators can coexist with defectors by form-
ing a mixed phase. If exceeding a second critical rc value (not
shown here), the defectors will die out and the system will ar-
rive at the pure C phase, as demonstrated in previous works
considering small group sizes [29, 35, 37–41]. In the present
work we focus on the group-size dependence of the lower crit-
ical rc that limits the surviving chance of cooperator strategy.
As Figure 2 suggests, increasing the group size can drastically
decrease the minimally required r for the sustenance of coop-
eration, and there is no indication of arriving at mean-field
behavior (note that rc = G in the well-mixed case [42]) even
for very large groups. However, the positive effect depends
significantly on the available set of potential strategy donors.
The smaller the latter (nearest neighbors→ focal group→ all
groups), the stronger the promotion of cooperation induced
by large G. An alternative, and in fact more interesting, inter-
pretation is that the larger the difference between interaction
(used for the accumulation of payoffs) and replacement (used
for selecting potential strategy donors) groups, the smaller the
rc at any given G. This is different from what was reported
in [43] for games governed by pairwise interactions, where
cooperators were found diminishing as the overlap between
interaction and replacement graphs was lessened.
Our observations can be corroborated further by consider-
ing public goods games where each player x acquires its pay-
off Px only from the one group where it is focal. Figure 3
shows the results. The most relevant difference with the re-
sults presented in Fig. 2 can be observed for the case where
strategy donors are selected amongst all the groups where
player x is a member (filled circles). Note that distant players
can interact indirectly here, i.e. although they do not collect
payoffs from the same group, their strategies influence the in-
come of the other player. In this case there exists an optimal
group size where rc is minimal (instead of a continuous down-
ward trend), although the well-mixed limit (rc = G), and
3FIG. 4: (Color online) Characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid for
G = 5 (top row) and G = 301 (bottom row), using focal group
imitation range as obtained for K/G = 0.1 and L = 200 system
size. Cooperators are marked by green (light grey) and defectors by
red (dark grey) colors. In both cases the final outcome is a full D
phase where normalized synergy factors are almost equal far from
the transition points (r/G = 0.74 and r/G = 0.24, respectively).
Prepared initial states were used to highlight the two significantly
different strategy invasion processes. Snapshots in the top row were
taken at MCS = 0, 50, 100, 200 and 1500, while in the bottom row
they were taken at MCS = 0, 30, 100, 300 and 400.
in fact even the small-group limit (r/G → 0.915), is never
reached for very large G. Results presented in Fig. 3 lead
to the conclusion that it is beneficial for the evolution of co-
operation not only if the interaction and replacement groups
are different, but also, when players have the ability to play
the game (collect their payoffs) with other players who are
beyond the scope of potential donors of a new strategy. For
the uppermost curve in Fig. 3 (closed circles) this is not war-
ranted (note that the payoffs are collected only from the group
where a given player x is central, while strategy donors are
sought from all the groups where player x is member), and it
is indeed there where the promotion of cooperation by means
of large groups is least effective. Nevertheless, large groups
are definitely better suited for the effective provision of pub-
lic goods under unfavorable conditions (small r) then small
groups, thus supporting the experimental findings of Isaac et
al. [36].
Characteristic snapshots of the spatial grid for small and
large G, as depicted in Fig. 4 in the top and bottom row,
respectively, serve well to understand the differences in the
evolutionary process that is brought about by differently sized
groups. For small groups (G = 5, top row), the evolution
of strategies proceeds with the characteristic propagation of
the fronts of the more successful strategy (in this case D) un-
til eventually the maladaptive strategy C goes extinct. For
intermediate values of r, we would observe the well-known
clustering of cooperators [21]. On the other hand, for large
groups (G = 301, bottom row) the cooperator clusters are
very strong and can easily outperform the defectors, even if
r is very small. However, as the number of defectors in the
large groups goes down, their payoff suddenly becomes very
competitive, to the point where defectors can strike back and
invade the seemingly invincible cooperative clusters. Such
an alternating time evolution is completely atypical and was
previously associated with cooperators only (see for example
[44]), i.e. the density of cooperators typically goes down ini-
tially, until some form of reciprocity or a feedback effect es-
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Time courses of the density of cooperators ρC
for G = 5 (dashed blue line) and G = 445 (solid red line), starting
from the mentioned prepared initial state (see Fig. 4) and using all-
group imitation range, as obtained for K/G = 0.1 and L = 800
system size. Synergy factors were r/G = 0.7 and r/G = 0.6,
respectively.
tablishes itself and enables the cooperators to win back lost
ground to defectors. For spatial public goods games played in
large groups we here demonstrate that the scenario is exactly
the opposite. Defectors are the ones who can resurrect from
small numbers to overtake cooperators, and it is indeed the
difficulty of prevention of this negative backfiring of the ini-
tial cooperative success that limits the success of large groups
to sustain cooperation at even smaller multiplication factors.
The two opposite time courses presented in Fig. 5 illus-
trate the atypical evolutionary process at large G succinctly.
To obtain smooth curves, we have used larger system sizes
(L = 800) and averaged the data over 50 independent runs.
While for small G (dashed line) the fraction of cooperators
ρC decreases monotonically to zero, the outlay for G = 445
(solid line) is very much different. There we can first observe
a significant increase in ρC , which is brought about by the
formidably strong cooperative phalanx, which can easily de-
feat weak defectors deep in the D domain. The dissolution of
D domains, however, serves well the surviving defectors who
then become the “leaders” of a counter attack that eventually
leads to the complete extinction of cooperators. Hence, we
can observe the fall of ρC , although as emphasized, this one
is due to completely different circumstances than the one re-
ported for the G = 5 case. The time evolution of defectors,
as we have demonstrated for G = 445 (dominance following
near extinction), was previously associated with cooperative
behavior only, and it is only the special impact of distant inva-
sion, which is made possible by large groups, on the evolution
of cooperation that is able to offer such a reversal of expected
roles of the two strategies.
In sum, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in
the spatial public goods games on the square lattice, thereby
focusing on revealing the impact of different group sizes on
the effective provision of public goods. Motivated by the ex-
perimental findings indicating that larger groups are advanta-
geous to small groups [36], we find that large groups indeed
4significantly promote the evolution of cooperation. Quite re-
markably, if only the interaction and replacement groups are
sufficiently different, and if players have the ability to play
the public goods game with at least some of the players that
are then not considered as potential donors of a new strategy,
the large groups prove impervious to defectors even at very
low multiplication factors. Since spatial reciprocity is inher-
ently routed in the formation of compact cooperative clusters,
it seems natural that larger groups, potentially giving rise to
larger cooperative clusters, will be more effective in warrant-
ing high levels of cooperation than small groups. However,
it is the size of large groups that may backfire on the coop-
erators when the number of defectors in such groups become
very low. Then the advantages of defection become so strong
that cooperators may still be defeated despite of their stel-
lar start. It is mainly this mechanism that limits the success
of large groups to sustain cooperation and puts a lid on the
pure number-in-the-group effect [45]. We would also like to
emphasize that the identified mechanism of promotion of co-
operation by means of participation in large groups is robust
and independent of details such as the uncertainty by strategy
adoptions or the local structure of the interaction network. In
particular, the joint membership in large groups will indirectly
link vast numbers of players [29], thus rendering local as well
global structural properties of interaction networks practically
irrelevant for the final outcome of the game. There are several
examples, like local and federal tax payment, health insurance
or pension systems, when people are involved in partly sep-
arated large structured common ventures. Without applying
our model directly to such systems, the present work offers
an explanation why in fact cooperation can survive even when
the benefits of large-scale collaboration are relatively modest.
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